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PROFILES OF DIALOGUE FOR
REPAIRING FAULTS IN ARGUMENTS
FROM EXPERT OPINION
Abstract. Using the profiles of dialogue method we identify a species of ad
verecundiam fallacy that works by forestalling of questioning in arguments
from expert opinion. A profile of dialogue is a graph structure used to
model a sequence of speech acts surrounding both the putting forward of
an argument and the response to it at the next moves in a dialogue. The
method is applied to a case of cross-examining a software engineer in a legal
deposition in a case of intellectual property litigation.
Keywords: arguments from authority; argument from expert opinion; profiles of dialogue; examination of expert witnesses; argument graphs; ad
verecundiam fallacy

1. Introduction
Profiles of dialogue [11, 21] are schematics modeling local sequences of
moves and countermoves in a dialogue to indicate how the sequence
should properly proceed according to the global dialogue protocol. The
motivation for establishing the profiles of dialogue method lies in applying formal systems of dialogical logic established by Lorenzen and
Lorenz [14] and formal dialectic proposed by Hamblin [8] to argumentation problems such as those concerning informal fallacies. The features
of these two approaches to formal dialogue systems that turned out to
be particularly important in developing the profiles of dialogue method
were: (i) their focus on the structure of dialogue conceived as a sequence
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of moves of the proponent and the opponent, and (ii) the aim of building
formal models of argument [13, p. 72].
The method of determining profiles of dialogue has been employed
within various traditions and approaches to argumentation and with respect to diverse communication phenomena. Van Eemeren [19, p. 98]
used profiles to model sequential patterns of argumentative moves made
by participants in a critical discussion and investigate strategic maneuvering in argumentation. Walton [23, pp. 37–38] first used the profiles
technique as an argumentation tool1 , applying it to the fallacy of many
questions. Krabbe [11] applied it to relevance criticisms, Walton [25] to
arguments from ignorance, Krabbe [12] to equivocation criticisms, and
Krabbe [12], Van Eemeren et al. [21] and Walton [27] to studying shifts
in burden of proof and presumptions arising from them.
In this paper, we apply the profiles method to problems in modeling
the ad verecundiam fallacy. Argumentum ad verecundiam is generally understood as an attempt to intimidate an opponent by citing a respected
authority (e.g. [6]). The species of the fallacy we select as the target
of our analysis is the kind of argumentation from authority that puts
forward an argument from expert opinion in such a forceful manner that
the respondent is intimidated, blocking off further critical questioning.
We model this strategic maneuver by using pairs of profiles where each
member of the pair is a directed graph. We show how our dual version of
the profiles method may be employed as a tool representing sequences of
speech acts surrounding both the putting forward of an argument from
expert opinion and the response to it given by the other party. A descriptive profile of dialogue is used to build a graph representing a sequence
of moves that is inappropriate or problematic. A normative profile of
dialogue represents the permissible sequence of speech acts (moves in a
dialogue) for each party. The comparison between the two sequences provides a method that can help an argument analyst as part of the process
of collecting and structuring evidence for judging whether a fallacy of
argumentum ad verecundiam has been committed or not in a given case.
A negative finding of the paper is that despite the clear linkage between arguments from expert authority and the ad verecundiam technique, the existing argumentation scheme for argument from expert opin1
Krabbe [12, p. 158] wrote that although there are no doubt earlier uses of the
profiles technique to be found, the first use of them going by that name occurs in
Walton [23, pp. 67–70].
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ion does not entirely grasp the key elements of fallacious ad verecundiam
arguments. The paper moves on from there to lay the groundwork for establishing a new approach to the traditional argumentum ad verecundiam
by extending the profiles of dialogue method to capture the structure of
appeals to authority in cases where sophistical use of the ad verecundiam
technique is a problem. The application of the profiles tool to a case of
a legal deposition illustrates this new approach to the ad verecundiam
fallacy.

2. Arguments from Expert Opinion
We begin by considering a standard version of the scheme for argument
from expert opinion [24]. A is a proposition (statement). S is a subject
domain that can be taken as a field of expertise.
Expertise Premise: E is an expert in subject domain S.
Expert Opinion Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
Domain Premise: A is within S.
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
If a respondent asks any of the six basic critical questions [24, p. 223]
appropriate for the appeal to expert opinion, the proponent must either
give a satisfactory answer to the question, or give up the argument from
expert opinion.
Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
Field Question: Is E an expert on S?
Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Since two critical questions on this list, i.e., the expertise question
and the trustworthiness question may appear to point to a similar feature
of an argument from expert opinion (namely expert’s ethos), it is justified to explicate the substantial difference between them. The expertise
question asks about the expert’s depth of knowledge in the field. The
trustworthiness question asks about ethical matters, such as whether
the expert might be biased, or may have lied in the past [15]. The type
of dialogue that is involved when a layperson converses with an expert
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to solicit the opinion of the expert is called examination dialogue [26].
Examination dialogue is familiar in law, and it is very commonplace
for lawyers to have to examine experts in court, and in particular to
cross-examine an expert offering testimony on the opposed side. How to
conduct examination dialogues is an important skill for trial lawyers.
Once we have the argumentation scheme and the matching set of
critical questions, it is easy to deal with many of the typical kinds of
instances of the ad verecundiam fallacy given in the logic textbooks.
Typical cases are ones where the source cited is not really an expert at
all, or where the expert is not named, or where the source is an expert in
the field different from the one that matches the topic or fits the field of
expertise matching the subject domain of the proposition at issue [24,27].
The critical questions are specially designed to repair the fault encountered in these kinds of cases by indicating the gap that needs to be filled
in the argumentation scheme for the premises to support the conclusion.
Many of the most vexing and problematic examples of argument
from expert opinion, however, are not of this relatively manageable kind.
These more complex and difficult to evaluate examples are cases where
the argument from expert opinion is put forward in such a manner as
to make it appear inappropriate to put forward counterarguments, or
even critical questions, that might challenge the authority of the expert.
These are more difficult cases because they cannot be evaluated using
only the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion and its
matching critical questions, or any of the more familiar devices such as
combining argumentation schemes with argument diagrams. These cases
require some extended kind of structure that can combine argument diagrams and argumentation schemes with some model of how a questioner
or critic responds to an argument from expert opinion. Such an extended
model has to be able to capture the notion of the sequence of exchanges
in the form of speech acts between two, or even several participants
taking part in what is supposed to be some normative framework such
as a critical discussion that has normative rules governing the moves of
each party as they take turns putting forward arguments and responding
to them [18]. It is just this sort of model that will form the framework of
the method of profiles of dialogue put forward in this paper and meant
to be applied to problematic cases of argumentation.
In order to explain the above difficulties of argument evaluation, we
will now briefly point to three most general and quite intuitive steps of
the procedure, namely (i) argument identification, (ii) argument analysis
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and (iii) argument evaluation. First, the task of argument identification
proceeds by identifying the argumentation scheme fitting the text of
the argument to be examined. Second, the task of argument analysis
proceeds by doing such things as considering alternative interpretations
of the text, looking for implicit premises, and so forth. Third, the task of
argument evaluation proceeds by weighing the given argument in relation
to other relevant pro and con arguments in the given case. In practice,
these three tasks are interconnected, but here it can be noted that issues
of burden of proof are especially important in argument evaluation. In
such cases, a simple argument diagram by itself is generally not a powerful enough tool to evaluate the argument in such a way that fallacies
and the shifts of the burden of proof can be analyzed and studied.
Here we have to look at the formal dialectical structure of the argumentation, the speech acts put forward as moves by each side, the
responses made to them, and whether the assertions, arguments and
other speech acts meet the protocols for the structure of the dialogue
as a whole. The profile of dialogues technique, as we show, is the tool
needed to carry out this task effectively. Hence, by claiming that there
are difficulties in evaluating some complex cases of arguments from expert opinion, we do not claim however that such cases should be left aside
in argument studies. The third step of evaluating arguments should be
preceded by a careful identification and analysis. Our hypothesis is that
the profiles of dialogue method is a tool that by making identification
and analysis plain allows us to identify and repair faults in argument
from expert opinion.
When someone who is a qualified expert puts forward an opinion in
a domain of expertise that matches that of the subject matter of the
examination, provided the argument thus expressed fits the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion, a presumption is lodged
in place in favor of the acceptability of the claim made. But there can
be a shift in the burden of proof, and accordingly canceling of this presumption in favor of the expert opinion is inappropriate critical question
is posed. Now the burden of proof is on the proponent who put forward
the expert opinion to respond appropriately to the question. Otherwise
the presumption in favor of the expert opinion is removed. In short, as
an argument from expert opinion is put forward and critically questioned
by someone who is skeptical about it, there is a shifting back and forth of
the burden of proof from one side to the other. The dialectical procedure
is one in which critical questions are asked and answered [27].
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These observations pose a problem, however, for those who wish to
analyze arguments from expert opinion with the aid of a graph structure represented by a typical argument diagram. For instance in such
a diagram, the nodes of the graph represent propositions, and cannot
normally be used to model questions, such as the asking of critical questions. So how can we evaluate the argumentation that takes place during
an examination dialogue where an argument from expert opinion is put
forward by one side and critically questioned by the other side? The
answer is that we have to begin by understanding normative frameworks
of argumentation [31].
To model problematic cases of the ad verecundiam fallacy and judge
whether or not a given argument from expert opinion is acceptable in a
given case depends not only on the requirements of the argumentation
scheme having been met, but also on how dialectical extensions of the
argument respond to criticisms, and especially to criticisms posed by the
asking of appropriate critical questions matching the scheme. The distinction between criticisms to argumentum ad verecundiam and critical
questions may lead us to ask what other criticisms could there be than
those which are normally included in the critical questions. In order to
make this distinction plain we may notice that the general methodology
of argumentation is to evaluate an argument by comparing it to relevant
pro and con arguments that may be brought forward to support or attack
it. In general, there can be any number of these pro and con arguments.
The critical questions matching the argumentation scheme merely represent standard questions that can be used to help a logic student, or
a user of any kind, identifying some weak points characteristic of this
type of argument that can suggest ways of moving forward to more fully
evaluate the argument.
It needs to be also noted here that the list of critical questions above
does not represent all the possible critical questions that might be asked
in a dialogue attempting to evaluate the acceptability of an argument
from expert opinion. It represents only the basic ones that can be used
to help teach a critical thinker how to respond to arguments from expert
opinion. There can be sub-questions of each critical question, resulting
in a more extensive sequence of argumentation in a dialogue between the
two parties. This can be represented in the normal way by a larger argument diagram representing how the pro and con arguments are weighed
against each other.

Profiles of dialogue for repairing faults . . .

7

An evaluation of a given instance of an argument from expert opinion,
such as might take place in a legal examination of an expert witness in
a trial, must take the form of a dialogue, a sequence of pro and con
arguments [4, 27]. Such a dialogue is represented normatively by a sequence of speech acts representing the arguments put forward and the
counterarguments responding to them in a given case.
In formal models of examination dialogue, each party takes turn asking or answering questions by using speech acts. These speech acts are
connected together in sequences called profiles of dialogue [11, 19]. For
example a profile of dialogue could be an interviewer asking an expert
a question, the expert responding to that question by giving an answer,
and the interviewer following up by asking about some point in the
answer that needs further clarification. It is a normal part of such a
dialogue that the interviewer needs to ask critical questions, and in the
case of a cross-examination some of these critical questions can be quite
argumentative. For example the interviewer might point out that the expert is being paid to testify and therefore the question arises whether this
expert may have a bias. Or the interviewer might point out that other
leading experts disagree with the opinion put forward by this expert.
There is a presumption in favor of an expert opinion, provided it
meets the requirements of the scheme for the argument from expert
opinion [24]. When it comes to studying the ad verecundiam fallacy,
the problem is that critical questioning may be deflected, interrupted
or shielded off altogether because the argument from expert opinion has
been put forward too forcefully, or because of the general presumption in
favor of an argument from expert opinion, the audience tends to defer to
the expert authority and hesitates to question it. The factor of deference
comes in because certain kinds of questions can be reasonable, even if
they are fairly aggressive in attacking the credibility of the expert. If
such questions are posed in the right way, they do not derogate from the
deference due to the legitimate expert that is being questioned.
After all, experts know about the subject matter in their fields because they have special training in the field, whereas the interviewer, a
layperson in that field, cannot challenge the expert directly as if she were
also an expert. Doing so would be claimed (by a party who puts forward
an argument from expert opinion) to be a breach of respect due to a
genuine expert by failing to pay due deference to the special knowledge
possessed by the expert. On the other hand, the assumption that experts always have to be right, and that laypersons would be immodest to
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question this because of the deference that should be paid to an expert,
gives rise to the possibility of fallacious use of arguments from expert
opinion. Such arguments can be used to unfairly suppress the capability
of the interviewer to ask the proper critical questions that are needed to
make sense of and to evaluate the expert’s opinion that has previously
been offered.
To build a dialectical structure that can be used to judge in a given
case whether an argument from expert opinion is reasonable enough as
it stands, or should be placed into the fallacious category of ad verecundiam, we now turn to seeing how moves in a dialogue are modeled
as speech acts that can be connected together in an orderly way to
normatively represent the dialectical structure of the sequence of argumentation in such cases.

3. Speech Acts
In a persuasion dialogue of the kind represented by the critical discussion [20], as well as in the Socratic dialogues widely studied in ancient
philosophy, there are two speech acts that are fundamentally important.
One is the action of asking a question of the yes-no type [8, 9]. This
is the speech act of asking whether the hearer thinks a proposition selected by the speaker is accepted by the hearer or not. The other is the
speech act of putting forward an argument. This is the speech act of
making a claim C and making an attempt to get the hearer to accept
C by offering a set of premises from which C can be derived by an a
inference. In formal argumentation systems such an inference is labeled
by an argumentation scheme, for example the scheme for argument from
expert opinion. In such a system, the speech act is the input and the
output is the immediate effect of the move that automatically takes place
in the record of the dialogue once the move is made. The dialogue itself
is defined as a sequence of pairs of such speech acts, and typically path
of argumentation consisting of pro and con arguments runs through the
sequence, holding it together.
Table 1 defines some of the main speech acts. It shows how argumentation characteristic of problems related to the ad verecundiam type of
argumentation can be represented in a dialogue framework with speech
acts and dialogue moves. The move made the speaker is the input, and
then according to the dialogues rules, the output produced is the effect
of the speech on the hearer, in conformity with the protocol [2, 17].
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Speaker’s Move

Yes-No Question

A?

Assertion
Concession

Assert A.
Accept A.

Retraction

No commitment A.

Put an Argument
Forward

A1 , A2 , . . . , An
therefore C.

Why-question

Why A?

9

Hearer’s Commitment
Hearer must commit to A or
not-A.
Hearer becomes committed to A.
Hearer becomes committed to A.
A is immediately removed from
speaker’s commitment store.
Hearer must either accept C or
attack the argument.
Hearer must put an argument for
A forward or retract A.

Table 1. A Speech act representation of the ad verecundiam technique

Although Table 1 contains our own attempt at presenting the structure of argumentum ad verecundiam in terms of speech acts, comparable
tables of speech acts resembling this one to some extent are now common
in the literature. For example Prakken [17] proposes the comparable (but
structurally different) table of typical speech acts.
Note that a why-question is not meant to ask for an explanation in
this example. It meant to request an argument to support a claim, and
the normal protocol it brings with it is a requirement of burden of proof
(evidential burden), as shown in the bottom row.
Let us examine the other speech acts, starting from the top. A statement (proposition) is an entity that is asserted in an affirmative sentence.
It has the property of being true or false. This way of framing the matter
may make an impression that this approach excludes claims to acceptability. However, from our dialogue-oriented point of view, acceptability
is the main notion. We use the device from Hamblin’s account of the
arguer’s ‘commitment store’ [8]. This is simply a set of propositions,
and new propositions can be inserted into it, or propositions that were
previously accepted can be deleted from it, depending on the speech
acts put forward by the participants at the various moves. Nowadays
it is called a knowledge base. For example if a participant asserts a
particular proposition, it immediately goes into his commitment set. If
a participant retracts a particular proposition, it is immediately deleted
from his commitment set.
An assertion, in contrast is a speech act made as the content of a move
in a dialogue. Commitment to a proposition is also a speech act that
signifies acceptance. Each participant in a dialogue has a commitment
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set (commitment store). At each move statements (propositions) are
inserted into an agent’s commitment set or removed from it, depending
on the type of move made and the protocol (procedural rules) for the
dialogue. In the model of persuasion dialogue in [30, p. 123] commitment is controlled by five factors: (1) the type of speech act made at a
given move, (2) the prior moves in the dialogue, all of which have been
recorded, (3) the type of dialogue in which the move was made (such as
persuasion dialogue), (4) the communal goal of the dialogue, made clear
at the opening stage, and (5) the rules for that type of dialogue.
As arguments contain statements that are asserted, we need to clarify
the difference between an argument, a speech act and an assertion. In our
approach, a speech act is essentially the content of a move in a dialogue.
Every speech act has preconditions and post-conditions defined by the
dialogue protocol. When a speech act is put forward as a move, the other
party (normatively speaking) has to respond appropriately to that move
according to the protocols for the dialogue. An assertion is a particular
type of speech act.
It is more complex to define what an argument is. Curiously, this
particular concept is highly contested within the field of argumentation
studies. Everybody seems to have a different theory. But perhaps to
explain the distinction in a simple way, an argument is a complex unit
made up of (1) premises and conclusion that are propositions (points in
the graph) and (2) and an inference (an arrow in the graph) joining a
set of premises to a conclusion. However, in reality things are not that
simple, because it may be possible for an argument to have more than
one conclusion (multiple conclusion arguments), and it is possible to
chain arguments together forming a sequence of argumentation. Also,
it is generally important that one of these propositions be designated
at the outset as the ultimate conclusion of the argument (the root of
the tree), according to the traditional stasis theory. The speech act of
putting forward an argument is normally a claim made by an arguer
that the ultimate conclusion should be acceptable to the respondent in
the dialogue, based on the respondent’s acceptance of the premises (and
also on the inferential link (argumentation scheme) joining them to the
conclusion). The explication of how the instance of arguing is founded in
dialogue moves has been proposed using the Inference Anchoring Theory
[3] that allows us to represent links from transitions between moves in a
dialogue to inferential premise-conclusion structures.
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Next, let us concentrate on the bottom two speech acts in Table 1.
The speech acts that are most central to formal argumentation dialogue
structures of the kind that have been investigated so far are those of
making an assertion, putting forward an argument and challenging an
assertion or argument [9, 16]. Making an assertion is to make a claim
that some proposition is true, or at any rate acceptable. An assertion is
challenged by requesting that the proponent prove it. This move means
essentially that the proponent has to give some argument to support
the claim. There are three ways an argument can be attacked in such a
formal dialogue system, by undermining, rebutting or undercutting. The
hearer can attack one or more of the premises (undermining). The hearer
can attack the conclusion of the argument (rebutting). Or the hearer
can attack the inferential link between the premises and the conclusion
(undercutting).
We can already see that some of the speech acts shown in Table 1
are closely connected to certain informal fallacies well known in the argumentation literature. Krabbe [11] showed that the following sequence
of dialogue is often associated with the fallacy of argument from ignorance. The so-called argument from ignorance (or argument from lack
of evidence) has this form: A has not been proved to be true (as far
as we know), so we can conclude that A is false. As can be shown by
the dialogue below, arguments from ignorance are also associated with
problems about shifting of a burden of proof.
Speaker: Assertion P .
Hearer: Why-P ?
Speaker: Why not-P ?
The rule for responding to a why-question, as shown by the entry
in the table of speech acts in Figure 1, is connected to the fallacy of
many questions [8, pp. 38–40]. The profiles method has already been
applied to such questions [23, pp. 65–71], where it was shown using
the profiles method that such questions are not always fallacious. For
example, in a trial where the defendant has already admitted committing
the crime of child abuse, the prosecutor attorney could quite reasonably
ask him the question ‘Have you stopped committing child abuse?’ and
the question could be quite legitimate (both legally and logically). Of
course, in a different context of dialogue, asking the same question could
be fallacious.
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4. Profiles of Dialogue
To determine whether a given instance of what looks like an argumentum ad verecundiam is fallacious or not, the argumentation schemes for
argument from expert opinion [24], along with the sets of critical questions matching these schemes, is the beginning of a general method.
But according to our analysis, collecting evidence to show whether the
argument is used in the given instance is fallacious, one needs to see
how the argument was employed in a given dialogue setting. In many
instances, however, it is not necessary to bring in the full apparatus of
formal dialogue structures for the six basic types of dialogue [30, p. 66]
such as persuasion dialogue or negotiation dialogue. It is enough to look
at a short segment of dialogue and examine the textual evidence offered
by seeing how the speech acts are put forward and responded to in that
segment.
For this purpose, a particularly useful tool is the profile of dialogue [11, 19, 21, 23, 28]. A profile of dialogue is a relatively short sequence of moves (speech acts such as questions and replies) in a dialogue that represents how the sequence of exchanges should proceed,
according to the protocols of the type of dialogue the participants are
supposed to be engaged in. The profile of dialogue argumentation tool
originated from [23, pp. 37–38], where it was used to provide a model
of the fallacy of many questions. It has also been shown in [21, 27] how
it can model shifts in a burden of proof and presumptions arising from
them. Profiles of dialogue were described by Krabbe [11] as ‘tree-shaped
descriptions of sequences of dialectic that display the various ways a
reasonable dialogue could proceed’. According to Krabbe [11] and van
Eemeren et al. [21], such profiles can be used to assist an argument
evaluator to model the textual evidence in a given case ‘without having
to go through all the technical preliminaries for the complete definition
of a dialogue system’ [11, p. 277]. A profile of dialogue can be used to
abstractly represent the sequence of speech acts surrounding both the
putting forward of an argument and the response to it by the party to
whom the argument was directed. The profile of dialogue is embedded
in the overarching structure of a formal model of dialogue containing
argumentation schemes [31]. Such dialogue models are now in the mainstream of argumentation methods in artificial intelligence.
When looking to allied approaches in contemporary argumentation
studies, we may observe that the pragma-dialectical theory of argumen-
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tation [19, p. 98] also made use of dialectical profiles as sequential patterns of moves of the participants in a critical discussion that have a
dialectical aim at a particular stage of a critical discussion. The first
difference between the pragma-dialectical approach to dialogue profiles
is that whereas the pragma-dialectical profiles are representations of all
analytically possible moves in an ideal discussion called the critical discussion, the approach proposed in this paper aims at proposing a formal model of the dialectical structure [27, 28]. The second difference
is that our account of dialogue profiles not only indicates how the dialogue should ideally have gone, but also how dialogues actually proceed.
The comparative profiles technique proposed in this paper consists of
comparing normative profiles of dialogue to descriptive ones. By doing
that it allows us to identify some typical fallacies that might be identified as sequences of improper dialogue moves. The proposed technique
is specifically designed for the identification and evaluation of fallacies,
most notably shown by our application of it to a problematic aspect of
the ad verecundiam fallacy.
The problem with this way of responding to the asking of an appropriate critical question is that it suppresses the capability of the
questioner, or anyone else for that matter, from properly evaluating the
argument from expert opinion. Indeed, it has a tendency to shut down
the dialogue altogether from proceeding any further. It is even suggested
in [24, p. 246] that this type of response is the identifying mark of the
fallacious use of the argument from expert opinion. This suggestion can
be combined with the analysis of Walton and Koszowy [29] that portrays
using an epistemic expert as a deontic authority as a common vehicle
for carrying out precisely this type of strategic maneuvering to make it
seem inappropriate that critical question should even be raised at all.
To model this kind of situation, we first need to define a a profile of
dialogue as a graph structure that represents how a sequence of argumentation should ideally go in a formal dialogue structure such as that
of Walton and Krabbe [30]. To begin with this project we need first of
all to define the notion of a graph, a well-known mathematical structure
commonly used in artificial intelligence argumentation models. A graph
is here defined as an ordered pair hV, Ei, where E is a subset of the
two-element subsets of V [32, Ch. 4]. V is a set of vertices, sometimes
called points or nodes. E is a set of edges, sometimes called lines or
arcs. It is customary to represent a graph as a diagram where the nodes
are joined by lines. For example, in a standard argument diagram [5],
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the vertices are propositions (premise or conclusions) and the edges are
inferences joining the propositions together. The graph is defined as a
directed graph if every pair of its elements hV, Ei is an ordered pair. So
a directed argument graph has arrows representing the direction of an
inference. A walk is an alternating sequence of points and lines v0 , x1 ,
v1 , . . . , vn−1 , xn , vn , in which each line is incident with the two points
immediately preceding and following it. The walk is closed if v0 = vn . A
closed walk is a cycle if its endpoints are distinct and n > 3 [10, p. 13].
A tree is a graph that contains no cycles. A typical argument diagram
is a graph.
We need to extend this notion of a graph by at least indicating how
graphs are used in some current formal and computational argumentation systems as employed in artificial intelligence. We will choose to use
the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS), a formal argumentation
system that actually defines argumentation as a graph structure and
that uses argument diagrams of the kind familiar to those working in
argumentation studies. These argument diagrams are in fact graphs of
a particular kind [7], called bipartite graphs. A bipartite graph is one
where the vertices (nodes) are partitioned into two subsets. Figure 1 is
an argument diagram in the format of CAS that models the sequence
of argumentation as a bipartite, directed, labeled graph, consisting of
these two kinds of nodes. In the example shown in Figure 1, the rectangular nodes represent propositions (statements) and the circular nodes
represent the arguments. The argument diagram shown in Figure 1 is a
bipartite graph meaning that no two rectangular nodes are adjacent to
each other, and no two circular nodes are adjacent to each other. CAS
is currently under development and at the present time there are four
versions that have been implemented and are available on the Internet
at https://carneades.github.io/. Version 2 is the system used in
this paper. In version 2, the circular nodes in a CAS argument diagram
are labelled as representing pro or con arguments. A pro argument
supports the proposition or argument it points to, while a con argument
attacks the proposition or argument it points to. In order to show how
our method of profiles of dialogue will model ad verecundiam arguments
generally, we begin with an abstract example, and from there we test
the profiles method on a real example.
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5. An Abstract Example of a Problematic Use
of Argument from Expert Opinion
The logical aspect of the ad verecundiam fallacy can be represented as
a profile of dialogue, since its effect is to forestall questioning of the
cited source by exploiting the deference to expertise of the party to
whom the argument was directed. By ‘logical aspects of argumentum
ad verecundiam’ we refer to the inferential structure as indicated by
the argumentation scheme for this type of argument, specifically in this
paper for the scheme for argument from expert opinion, but also including other kinds of argument from authority such as the argument from
deontic authority [29]. By using this label we draw a distinction between
the logical aspects and the broader dialectical aspects, referring to the
framework of dialogue in which the argument is embedded.
The profile of dialogue gives the capability to distinguish between
a sequence of arguments that follows the dialogue protocol regulating
which kinds of moves are permitted or forbidden in a particular type of
dialogue, and how these moves need to be ordered, to make the sequence
fit the protocol. If a different kind of sequence does not fit the protocol,
it is simply rejected by the profile model. It represents a sequence of
moves that is normatively incorrect, in relation to the dialogue protocol.
This kind of analysis using the profiles of dialogue enables us to identify
specific patterns in profiles that fit characteristics associated with the
fallacy. The specific pattern characteristic of the fallacy is that of forestalling questioning of the cited source by the respondent, by such moves
as not allowing critical questioning of the experts claim, or not allowing
counterarguments that might be directed against it, simply because admitting them would be evidence of not giving sufficient deference to the
opinion of an expert.
Consider the example shown in Figure 1 representing an abstract
dialogue exchange in a persuasion dialogue where the proponent P has
the task of persuading the respondent R to accept a proposition A,
and employs argument from expert opinion to achieve this aim. The
respondent begins the dialogue by asking a why-question that shifts the
burden of proof onto the proponent’s side to provide evidence to support
the claim that A is acceptable.
To begin to evaluate the sequence of argumentation in this case,
we first have to look back to the list of critical questions appropriate
for responding to an argument that fits the scheme for argument from
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#

Speech Act

Pt

Move

Evaluation

1

Why-question

R

Appropriate

2

Argument

P

3

Question

R

4

Argument

P

5

Assertion

R

6

Argument

P

Why A?
E is an expert on S, E asserts
that A, and A is in S.
What evidence is E’s
assertion based on?
You are not an expert in
this subject, so you could not
understand the evidence.
To evaluate the argument, I
need to find out what evidence
E’s opinion is based on.
You cannot evaluate the
evidence because could
not understand it.

Appropriate
Appropriate
Inappropriate
(Blocker)
Appropriate
Inappropriate
(Blocker)

Table 2. A dialogue illustrating a typical ad verecundiam problem

expert opinion. In particular, it is useful to look at the critical question
‘Is E’s assertion based on evidence?’ When this critical question has
been put by a respondent to a proponent who has just put forward an
argument from expert opinion, the proponent is automatically restricted
by the dialectical protocols of a persuasion dialogue to putting forward
certain speech acts at the next move. One legitimate response open to
the proponent is to furnish some evidence that the expert has provided
showing that her claim that statement A is true was based on evidence.
Otherwise, if it is not known whether the expert’s opinion was based on
any evidence, the proponent needs to admit such a lack of evidence. If
the expert is present in a three party dialogue situation, she can be asked
the question: what is your evidence to support proposition A? If she
fails to present evidence, or in the two-party situation where the expert
is absent, the proponent cannot furnish any evidence in response to the
critical question, then the argument from expert opinion fails.
Figure 1 represents a descriptive profile of dialogue for the example
above. The root of the tree, shown at the top, shows a rectangular
node with rounded corners containing a speech act, a why-question, put
forward in the dialogue as a move of the respondent. The proponent
is designated as the party putting forward the argument from expert
opinion, shown just below. The respondent’s next move is to ask for evidence. The proponent asserts that the question about evidence does not
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Figure 1. Descriptive profile of dialogue for problematic argument
from expert opinion

need to be ensured and backs up this assertion by the three arguments
shown on the left. Hence the argument from expert opinion prevails, as
shown on the right.
A profile of dialogue can be computationally modelled as a dialogue
template [2] a schematic representation of a move and reply in a dialogue
and its underlying argument structure. Figure 1 is an argument diagram
in the format of CAS except that it uses a third node, the rounded
rectangular node, to represent questions. This style of diagramming is
an extension of CAS that uses a tripartite directed graph structure.
In this instance the tripartite graph structure is used to model a
sequence of moves in a dialogue rather than its more familiar use in
logic as a set of premises and conclusions in an argument diagram. The
graph provides a model of how a connected sequence of moves in the di-
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alogue can properly go, following the dialogue rules (protocol) showing
which kinds of moves are permissible or obligatory following a previous
move by the other party. Ideally, the arguers take turns, and respond
appropriately to each move of the other party, building up a connected
sequence of moves represented by the profile [1].
As the sequence of moves represented by the descriptive profile in
Figure 1 proceeds from the root node shown at the top through the next
two moves, the proper sequence that such a dialogue is supposed to take
is illustrated. The respondent asks a why-question, the proponent puts
forward an argument from expert opinion, assuming that E is an expert
source and that E has stated that A is true, according to the proponent.
At the next leaf in the tree the respondent asks the critical question of
whether E’s assertion was based on evidence.
Next let us consider the remainder of the argumentation shown in
Figure 1. At the top, when the respondent asks the why-question, the
proponent put forward an argument from expert opinion to answer the
question. The three premises fit the scheme for argument from expert
opinion, as indicated by the name of the scheme ex in the round node.
Hence the conclusion A follows (defeasibly) as indicate by the arrow to
the rectangle containing A. In response to the argument from expert
opinion, the respondent asks the sixth critical question from the list,
asking for evidence to back up the argument. So far, there is no problem.
But at this point, things start to go wrong.
At the next level, the proponent claims that the question does not
need to be answered. This answer is not allowed in the persuasion dialogue because the proponent is obliged to either fulfill the burden of proof
by supplying some evidence or retract A. This rule is one of the protocols
for this type of dialogue. The profile started out by representing only
permissible speech acts in the sequence of moves for each party, but now
it represents a different kind of move that is inappropriate, and that
even functions as a red flag suggesting that a fallacy may be about to be
committed. How do we know this? We can learn it by peeking ahead at
Figure 2, but let us postpone this until we examine what happens next
in Figure 1.
Looking back to Figure 1, we see on the left that the proponent has
backed up his assertion that the question does not need to be answered
by the sequence of argumentation shown on the left containing arguments a2, a3 and a4. The proponent argues that since the respondent is
not an expert, he could not understand the evidence, and she concludes
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from this that he cannot evaluate the evidence. Here we have very clear
indications from the profile of dialogue that the proponent is committing
an ad verecundiam fallacy. But remember that this is still a descriptive
graph. We are not yet considering the normative profile. As far as the
descriptive graph is concerned, the argument from expert opinion prevails against the objection put forward by the respondent and therefore
not only is the proposition A accepted, but by this means the proponent
has seen to it that further questioning is blocked off. It is the blocking
off of further questioning that assures that the claim A is secured by the
argument from expert opinion, as shown by the bent arrow on the right
leading to the conclusion A. This latter part of the graph displays the
definitive evidence that the instance of argument from expert opinion
shown in the profile represents a sequence of argumentation that results
in the dialogue being blocked off from making further progress towards
its goal of resolving the original conflict of opinions by means of rational
argumentation.
The way the profiles of dialogue technique works is by constructing
two directed graphs, each of which represents a sequence of speech acts
as moves in a dialogue between two agents. One of the graphs, called
a descriptive graph, represents the way the speech acts were actually
brought forward by the agents, as far as they can be reconstructed from
the text of discourse in the case. The other graph, called the normative
graph, represents the way the sequence of speech acts should have ideally
gone according to the protocols for the type of dialogue. By comparing
the two graphs an analyst can conduct a full diagnostic procedure to
determine where the dialogue went wrong in the actual case which was
thought to be fallacious or otherwise problematic.
To have a fuller explanation of the fallacy in this instance, we can
now look at Figure 2, which represents the normative profile of dialogue
showing by contrast with the descriptive profile which way the sequence
of argumentation should have ideally gone in order to prevent this kind
of fallacy from arising.
In contrast with the profile shown in Figure 1, the sequence of argumentation in Figure 2 follows the protocol for persuasion dialogue.
Look at what happens here when the argument from expert opinion is
put forward by the proponent and the respondent asks the backup evidence question. At this juncture in the profile it is made clear that the
proponent has two options following the request for evidence question,
according to the burden of proof protocol. Each option has an outcome
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Figure 2. Normative profile of dialogue for problematic argument
from expert opinion

displayed in the graph. The outcome shown on the right path is that the
proponent wins if he supplies the proper evidence requested by the respondent. The second outcome, shown on the left is that the proponent
loses, because he fails to offer the evidence sought by the questioner,
and therefore the argument from expert opinion fails. At this level, the
profile of dialogue shows the two speech acts the proponent is allowed to
respond with. In this way, the profile represents the proper sequence of
moves required by the dialogue protocols for the speech acts.
To sum up, what is shown by the graph in Figure 2 are the correct
types of moves that the proponent and the respondent are allowed to
make, and how these moves are connected in a sequence. To carry on
further to conduct an evaluation of whether an ad verecundiam fallacy
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has been committed in a real argument having the general outline of this
profile, the normative profile has to be applied to a reconstruction of the
actual sequence of dialogue shown in the descriptive profile. The normative profile draws on the protocol set by the rules of the normative model
of dialogue, such as a persuasion dialogue. The dialogue is basically a
persuasion type, because the proponent is trying to prove an ultimate
claim, the proposition A, and therefore the proponent has the burden
of persuasion set at the beginning of the dialogue. The respondent may
also have a burden to prove the negation of proposition A, or in other
cases may have the lesser task of playing the role of critic who wins if
the proponent fails to carry out her burden of proof. The next example,
a real example, shows what happens in a court of law. There is a shift
from the central persuasion dialogue to an examination interval during
which the expert is being cross-examined by the opposing attorney.

6. A Case of Cross-examining an Expert Witness
An engineer, Bob Zeidman, creator of a program for synthesizing software source code and president of an engineering corporation that is a
leading provider of software intellectual property analysis tools, participated in a legal case that was mainly decided on an evidential basis of
expert witness testimony [33]. Zeidman called it the case of the arrogant
expert. Zeidman’s client in the case was a small company that had invented a transistor circuit that could be used to replace previous devices
that were more complex and more expensive to produce. Subsequently
a big company bought a similar patent from a small company and used
their technology, allegedly protected by this patent, to make the same
kinds chips. However, Zeidman’s client, the small company, took the
case to court arguing that the large company’s patent was invalidated
by this earlier patent.
To defend their side, the large company hired an expert in electronics who held over 100 patents and had degrees from MIT and Stanford,
including a PhD in electrical engineering. Zeidman had the task of examining this extremely well-qualified and impressive expert in a deposition.
This expert produced a highly detailed report describing several patents
that he claimed invalidated the patent of the small company. Most of
the patents cited by the large company could be easily shown to not
be similar enough to the small company’s patent to invalidate it. But
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there was one that appeared to be similar enough to present a real danger to the case of the small company. Zeidman carefully examined the
technical details of this particular patent for some time, and figured out
that the description of the circuit in the patent described in it showed
that the voltages on either side of the transistor canceled each other out.
From this evidence he concluded that the circuit described in this patent
could not possibly work. That would mean that the key patent of the
large company was ‘non-enabling’ [33] and therefore that their claim of
a patent violation would fail.
This case is a fairly complex one, not only legally but also because of
the complex technology involved. Those of us not familiar with extended
intellectual property disputes about patents on software will undoubtedly
find it hard to follow sequence of argumentation that framed the legal
dispute. For this reason before introducing the expert testimony to be
modeled by the profile of dialogues technique, we present a descriptive
argument diagram in Figure 3 to give the reader an outline of the main
argumentation in the case.
The argument from expert opinion that is the starting point of the
argumentation in the case is shown at the top. E, a highly qualified
expert, reported several patents that he claimed invalidated the patent
of the small company. Based on this argument from expert opinion, the
conclusion that the large company’s patent is invalidated by the earlier
patent of the small company would fail. This argument led to a line of
investigation by Zeidman (Z), who had carefully gone through all of the
patents listed by the expert and concluded that none of them were similar
enough to the patent of the small company to invalidate their patent.
However, Zeidman did find one that appeared to be similar enough to
potentially defeat the argument of the small company. But once he
investigated the patent of the large company further, he found a serious
technical problem with it. The voltages on either side of the transistor
canceled each other out, so that the transistor could not possibly work.
Zeidman concluded from this investigation that the circuit described in
this patent could not work. Since the patent of the small company did
work, as shown by its success in the marketplace, the conclusion can
be drawn that the key patent in the expert’s list is non-enabling. The
conclusion can be drawn from this line of investigation is that the expert’s claim of patent violation is weakened. The entire line of argument
based on Zeidman’s investigation provides a counterargument attacking
the expert’s original conclusion that the large company’s patent fails
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to be invalidated by the small company’s earlier patent. It is within
this framework of argumentation that we can turn to the details of the
testimony of the expert in the deposition.
The lawyer who conducted the examination of the expert in the deposition was not only an engineer, but also highly experienced in cases
of detection of software intellectual property theft. He asked careful
questions to try to get the expert to explain how the circuit worked,
but the expert was often condescending in his replies. The two parties
became engaged in long technical discussions, and in the end the expert
tried to avoid responsibility for designing a circuit that didn’t work.
After two hours of examination, he finally had to admit that, but then
claimed that it was the attorneys wrote the report on the patent, and
he had simply advised them on how to write it. This was a dangerous
admission, because it was his responsibility as the expert to write up the
technical report. But he couldn’t bring himself to admit that he had
made a mistake.
During the deposition, the expert answered the questions put to him,
but took very long pauses and snapped at the lawyer whenever he was
interrupted, claiming that he hadn’t finished answering. In the end, the
deposition went on for exactly seven hours. The expert knew that there
was a rule in the Federal Laws of Civil Procedure stating that a deposition
cannot last longer than seven hours. At that point, he quickly left the
room, refusing to answer a request for further clarification of some of his
answers.
During the deposition, shown in the three rectangle with rounded
corners at the bottom left of Figure 3, the expert several times exhibited a condescending attitude toward the questioner by putting forward
speech acts that are evidence of a series of attempts to intimidate the
questioner and block off dialogue instead of providing helpful answers.
Note that in Figure 4 the moves on the left of the profile are all the
moves of the lawyer interviewing the expert. The moves on the right of
the profile are all the moves of the expert who is being interviewed, except
for the last two rectangles at the bottom right. These two rectangles have
to do with the continuing of the dialogue, an important factor for using
the profile to discuss, evaluate and repair potential instances of the ad
verecundiam fallacy.
In what follows, we show how the profile of dialogue method outlined
in the previous section may serve as a tool of analyzing the argumentation in this case. The descriptive profile of dialogue shows a problem

24

Marcin Koszowy, Douglas Walton

Figure 3. Descriptive profile for the arrogant expert case

that needs to be solved if the facts are to be brought out and understood in such a manner that the argument of the small company can
find an evidential basis for casting doubt on the claim made by the large
company that its key patent anticipated and was similar enough to the
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Figure 4. Normative profile for the arrogant expert case

device used by the small company. It is the job of lawyer who conducts
the deposition by examining the expert of the large company to try to get
him to offer a comprehensible explanation of how the device described
by his patent works.
From the textual evidence we do have, it can be seen that the way
that L responds to each of these dangerous moves is to defuse them by
offering modest replies that, instead on inviting further confrontation,
mildly and co-operatively steer the dialogue back onto a constructive
course. How L carried this out is shown in Figure 4.
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The sequence represented in Figure 4 not only records L’s actual
replies. It can also be taken to represent a normative ideal of how the
dialogue should go if it is to succeed in accomplishing its goal of resolving
the conflict of opinions set at the opening stage. At each of the three
moves, L is attacked as being immodest if he tries to question the expert
at all. Instead of rising to the bait and attacking E as being immodest
himself, L mildly clarifies his intentions, conceded politely that E is
indeed the expert, and deferentially asks for an explanation of how the
system works. Instead of being derailed by E’s provocative moves, the
dialogue is put back on track.
Now it can be seen how the comparison of figures 3 and 4 helps one
to diagnose the central fault in the ad verecundiam fallacy. The key
indicators of the ad verecundiam fallacy presented by the speech acts
put forward by E during the dialogue were already shown in Figure 3.
First there was the question, ‘How dare you question my expertise?’, in
which E shows that he is demanding deference from L. Such a move
in the dialogue is potentially a very powerful one in its effects over the
dialogue. It attempts to nullify all the previous moves made by L and the
evidence collected by Z in which he used evidence to show that the patent
described by E had to be non-enabling because the circuit described
by E simply didn’t work. In other words, all the argumentation put
forward by Z summarized in the argument diagram in Figure 3 is meant
to be canceled out by E’s attack. By this means the whole examination
dialogue in which L questioned E would be nullified by this attack if it
were successful. The reason is that it would be shown to be evidentially
inappropriate because L had no right to ask such questions at all. E’s
attack also has an anticipatory effect as a strategic maneuver, by making
any further attempts by L to question him equally inappropriate.
The second indicator was the statement that E was designing circuits
before L was born. This argument is an attempt to disqualify anything
said by L, on the grounds that E’s depth of knowledge on designing
electronic circuits means that L could not possibly understand the technical details of the patent, suggesting the conclusion that anything that
he said or might say in the future in the trial is worthless as evidence,
or even unworthy of consideration at all. The third speech act was E’s
statement, ‘I’m the expert here’, reaffirming the force of the previous
two speech acts.
What Figure 3 shows when compared with Figure 4 is that there is
a repair process available for the plaintiff to deal with such a tricky and
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dangerous situation that so badly compromises its capability to make a
case for its side. So the comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 4 indicates
not only the danger of the fallacy, and its potentially damaging effects
on the conversational exchange, but also suggests a way that the damage
can be repaired. The way illustrated in Figure 4 is for the questioner
to indicate in his replies that he is not being immodest by doubting the
expertise of the expert or trying to put himself in places someone who
knows better than the expert, or as knowledge of the subject at issue
greater than that of the expert.
Generally speaking the profiles of dialogue tool works by comparing
two sequences of argumentation, where each sequence is represented as a
directed graph structure of argument moves and counter-moves that can
be linear or branching. The descriptive tree represents an interpretation
of how the sequence of argumentation supposedly went, as reconstructed
from the given text. The other graph represents a normative model
showing how the sequence of argumentation should have gone in order
to successfully deal with the problem posed in the first graph. When the
two directed graphs, are compared, the comparison of the two profiles
can be used together as a method of fault diagnosis. The fault in this
case is revealed as the attempt to suppress the dialogue by the expert’s
anticipatory moves that block off or interfere with the proper moves that
should normally be next taken by the responding party. The fault can
be diagnosed by showing how this blocking off effect can be dealt with
and overcome so that the dialogue can properly move forward towards
its proper goal.

7. Reconfiguring the Ad Verecundiam Fallacy
This analysis using the profiles method reveals how, at least in this case,
ad verecundiam works as a fallacy. In this case, the diagnosis is that
the argument from expert opinion is not merely weak, by failing to meet
all the requirements of the scheme, or by inadequately responding to a
critical question. The fallacy is revealed to be a strategic maneuver of
trying to get the best of a speech partner unfairly by interfering with his
attempts to even ask critical questions, or otherwise conduct a proper
examination dialogue.
But an objection to our analysis might be made by claiming that
the only profile that captures this effect of stalling questioning is one
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where the addressee responds to the argument by accepting the arguer’s
assertion on the basis of its attribution to the source. The fallacy in
this kind of case would be for the addressee to accept a weak or poorly
unsubstantiated argument from expert opinion rather than even making
any attempt to critically question it, or point out ways in which either the
required premises of the scheme are not stated, or where critical questions
about the argument are not even posed. This certainly could be a failure
of the argument from expert opinion associated with the ad verecundiam
fallacy even though it does not represent the target failure to which our
analysis using the profiles method is addressed. This objection raises
the possibility that there could be kinds of failures associated with the
ad verecundiam fallacy other than the one identified by our use of the
profiles method.
Walton [24, Ch. 8], after conducting a survey of the treatments of the
ad verecundiam fallacy in the logic textbooks and in the other literature
on the fallacy, came to the conclusion that there were two types of faults
of reasonable argument associated with it. The one type of fault was described as an error in using the argumentation scheme for the argument
from expert opinion. For example, an argument from expert opinion
could suffer from the fault that the proponent putting it forward did not
even cite the name of the expert source. Another error of the same type
would be a failure to answer a critical question. For example the proponent’s argument might fail to answer the critical question of what evidence the claim of the expert was based on. When committing this type
of error, the addressee of the argument from expert opinion jumps too
quickly to acceptance of the conclusion. Diagnosing and repairing this
type of error does not require use of the profiles technique. As pointed
out in the introductory section of this paper, the argumentation scheme
with its matching set of critical questions is sufficient. It is the other type
of failure that has not been addressed well enough yet by the literature.
The other type of failure is committed by the dogmatic arguer who
presses forward with the argument from expert opinion too dogmatically
and aggressively by forestalling critical questioning of the argument or
preventing counter-arguments from even being put forward. It is this
type of failure that we have analyzed using the profile of dialogues tool.
To accommodate these objections, we recognize that there can be at least
two different kinds of failure associated with the ad verecundiam fallacy
and that our analysis of the fallacy using the profiles technique presents
is only a model of one of these, namely the second one. We do not say

Profiles of dialogue for repairing faults . . .

29

this limitation is a problem, however, because this type of fallacy is by
far the harder of the two variants to model in a way that exhibits it as
a logical failure that can be objectively diagnosed and evaluated.
The strategic maneuver [19] characteristic of ad verecundiam is modeled by the profile of dialogue, a graph structure to show how the unfair
interfering works by showing how it blocks the proper order of the speech
acts of questioning and replying in a dialogue that has a protocol consisting of rules that regulate the turn-taking and the putting forward
of speech acts. This is the objective structure used to explain how the
fallacy works as a device of strategic maneuvering. When we say such
a maneuver is trying to get the best of a speech partner unfairly, the
unfairness aspect is not a moralistic objection. It is an objection based
on the dialogue protocol. In other words, it is modeled as a violation of
the rules of proper procedure governing moves allowed in the dialogue.
Our model of this fallacy is based on the literature on formal models
of argumentation, such as [30, 31]. Our analysis assumes the existence
of such formal argumentation models, and fits into them by building a
heuristic (the profiles tool) that can handily be applied by argumentation
researchers to examples where ad verecundiam is suspected. The tool is
meant to be a useful alternative to using the full-blown formal dialogue
model with all of its protocols.
According to the pragma-dialectical theory [19, p. 197], the procedure
for analyzing and evaluating arguments in a text suspected to contain
a fallacy begins with identifying the moves made in the text as a particular kind of speech act which creates commitments for the arguer.
Moreover, on this theory, the allegedly fallacious argument is evaluated
by reconstructing the speech act to see if it proves to violate one of the
dialogue rules applicable to the case. Strategic maneuvering is permissible in the critical discussion, which can be classified here as a type of
persuasion dialogue, but contextual factors are important in the evaluation of whether an argument is fallacious or not, because strategic
maneuvering may involve a sequence of moves. Ultimately then, on this
approach [19, p. 203] fallacy judgments are contextual judgments that
always relate to strategic maneuvering in the specific circumstances of a
given case.
Our model of the kind of fallacy committed in (some) ad verecundiam
arguments using the profiles method comes under what van Eemeren [19,
p. 198] calls ‘fallacious strategic maneuvering’. It is not a mere error of
reasoning but a sophistical strategy used to deceive a speech partner.
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The profiles method is a useful tool for diagnosing and repairing this kind
of ad verecundiam fallacy. Apart from identifying the fallacious instances
of arguments from expert opinion, the more general aim of applying the
profiles of dialogue method is to provide a structure that can be used to
investigate strategic maneuvering. This task requires a formal dialectical
structure, and in addition, an adaption of the structure to a simpler
form, such as the graph structure of the profiles of dialogue technique as
proposed in this paper, that can be used to track the sequence of speech
acts in a dialogue through the various moves.
By allowing us to identify a fallacy as a particular sequence of dialogue moves, the profiles method offers also a profile-of-dialogue approach
to the concept of informal fallacy. Instead of concentrating on the negative aspect of using the concept of fallacy as merely a device for spotting
the logical error in someone’s argument, the profiles method offers the
possibility of not only diagnosing the error or shortcoming, but also the
capability of showing the other party how to diagnose and repair her
argument so that it can be improved.
So conceived, fallacy becomes more than just a device for putting
somebody down. The fallacious sequence of dialogue moves becomes a
constructive device for argument diagnosis and repair. For this reason,
adopting the profiles method suggests a much better approach to the
concept of fallacy that departs from the negative approach inherent in
the traditional textbook treatments criticized by Hamblin [8]. Once the
profiles approach has been accepted, it becomes outmoded to talk about
the ad verecundiam as a ‘gotcha’ move to attack an opponent for having
committing a fallacy.
Using this method we are able to achieve a more balanced approach
to arguments from expert opinion that sees them as very often reasonable
but subject to a variety of correctable faults that can be diagnosed and
repaired as they occur (or not) in specific cases. The argument analyst
compares the two graphs to examine and analyze what was missing or
inappropriate in the descriptive graph, and by moving to the normative
graph can diagnose the nature of the problem and build a recommendation on how to fix it. The profiles method enables us to go beyond merely
identifying the problem, for example by associating it with a traditional
informal fallacy category, but also to go beyond that to finding a way to
repair the fault. The beauty of the profiles method is that works as a
fault diagnosis tool that can not only find a fault, but also show how it
can be fixed.
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8. Conclusions
In this paper it has been shown that the existing argumentation scheme
approach to arguments from expert opinion, although it is vitally important in identifying the structure of appeals to expert authority, does
not do full justice to grasping the complexity of an ad verecundiam technique. As we have argued, a thorough examination of the sequence of
speech acts in the dialogue profile of an ad verecundiam technique is
helpful in exposing not only its failure to meet the requirements of the
argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion, but also for
grasping how it is a dialectical failure that is used to suppress critical
questioning and counter arguments in order to block the argumentation
off from getting further toward its legitimate goal.
The profiles method works by comparing two sequences of dialogue.
The descriptive sequence represents how the dialogue actually went, by
displaying the interconnected moves and counter moves that can be reconstructed from the text in a given case. The normative sequence represents how the dialogue ideally should have gone, in order for the fault
to be overcome and dealt with appropriately. By juxtaposing the one
graph with the other, the fallacious ad verecundiam argument can not
only be diagnosed as a fault in argumentation but also the means for
repairing the fault are given.
Previously, dialectical profiles have been used as analytical representations, for example by the pragma-dialectical school, to represent
all analytically possible moves in an ideal discussion called the critical
discussion. But this use of profiles does not show how existing formal
dialogue structures can be applied to the analysis and evaluation of real
cases of the ad verecundiam fallacy. What we have devised is a practical
tool for the analysis of given cases where an ad verecundiam fallacy is
suspected. This tool derives from the formal models of dialogue in the
literature, such as [30]. It works, as we have shown, by comparing a
normative profile to a descriptive profile. The problem posed by this
earlier literature was that the elaborate apparatus of formal dialogue
structures, in which each individual formal dialogue type has its own
particular protocol, it is simply too unwieldy for students of informal
logic and other users of argumentation to easily apply, even with significant training. Our version of the profiles tool defines it formally
as a graph structure, but a simple one that can handily be applied to
problems of analyzing and evaluating real arguments in natural language
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discourse without having to explicitly bring in all the protocols of the
applicable formal dialogue structures that are there in the background.
The application of the tool also reveals a means for repairing the fault.
Technically, profiles of dialogue are very close to the dialogue templates used by Bex and Reed [2] as schematic representations that combine argument structures with transitions in the dialogue from a move
to a reply. Dialogue templates look very much like the profiles in this
paper, and they are visualized as graphs that look somewhat like familiar argument diagrams except that they represent dialogue sequences in
formal dialogues such as CB.2 If we look back to Figure 3, the dialogue
shown at the bottom left in the large rounded rectangle node can be
seen as a dialogue template. Further research is needed to establish the
exact relationship between dialogue templates and profiles of dialogue.
It would appear that profiles work in a comparable way to dialogue
templates that can also incorporate arguments in some instances.
In this paper it has been shown that the existing argumentation
scheme approach to arguments from expert opinion, although it is vitally
important in identifying the structure of appeals to expert authority,
does not do full justice to grasping the complexity of the ad verecundiam
technique. As we have argued, a thorough examination of the sequence
of speech acts in the dialogue profile in the ad verecundiam technique is
helpful in exposing not only its failure to meet the requirements of the
argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion, but also for
grasping how it is a dialectical failure that is used to suppress critical
questioning and counter arguments in order to block the argumentation
off from getting further to its legitimate goal.
In particular, it has been shown that some real life examples of examination dialogues (as illustrated by the Zeidman example) illustrate
how the profiles technique can successfully be applied to cases where
the sophistical tactics type of ad verecundiam strategic maneuvering is
a highly powerful and dangerous type of argumentation. This particular example is a very interesting one because it brings out a novel and
heretofore largely uninvestigated aspect of the ad verecundiam fallacy.
Our findings provide evidence to suggest that widening our horizons on
2

The dialogue system CB [22, pp. 133–135] consists of locution rules (that determine permissible locutions, withdrawals, questions and challenges), commitment
rules (that indicate e.g. when a statement can be included in or withdrawn from a
player’s commitment store) and dialogue rules (that state what is the proper sequence
of dialogue moves).
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how to study this fallacy will enable argument analysts to tackle very
important cases that are highly worthwhile to study when one realizes
the problems they give rise to.
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